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THE

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTL\H,

)
)

PlaintiffRespondent,
-vs-

)
)
)

)
)

JAEES M. GRAY,

Case No. 15550

)

DefendantAppellant.

)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was a criminal action brought by the
State of Utah against defendant-appellant James ?!. Cray
charging him with burgularly, a felony in the second degree,
in violation of the Section 76-6-202 Utah Code Annota.ted,
1953 as amended.
DISPOSITIO!I IN LOHim COURT
In the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District, Uinta County, Utah on November 1, 1977 the jury
found appellant guilty of burgulary as charged.

Subsequently

appellant was sent to the Utah Stilte Prison for a term of
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I

one to fifteen years as provided by law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing
his conviction and quashing the information herein, or
in the alternative, remanding the case to the Fourth Judicial
District Court for a new trial consistent with the rulings
of this Court.
STATEME!n OF THE FACTS
The evidence discloses that a burgularly
occured on the 18th of September, 1977 in Uinta County,
State of Utah, that the defendant was periodically in the
company of the perpetrator of the burgularly and that tte
defendant may have aided the principal in the perpetration
or by selling one itEm obtained in the burgularly.

Further,

that the defendant was intoxicated during the day and
evening in question.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

OF COUNSEL.
In his opening statement defense counsel stated
to the jury that he was"appointed"counsel for the defendant
and thE.t he expected the evidence to show "That there
will be no evidence that the defendant here, Mr. Gray, ever
entered the premi.ses that was supposed to have alleged to
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be

burlarized" (T. 5).

Counsel also stated that " ... we

will introduce testimony from one of the parties that was
supposed to have been charged in this same action that he
didn't in fact--didn't commit the burgulary." (T.6)

Appar-

ently defense counsel was totally iv,norant of the aiding
and abetting statute (76-2-202 U.C.A. 1953 as amended) since
defense counsel in his opening argument stated that" ... he
might have dealt in some of the or handled some of the items
as to the burgularly ... " (T.5) and in his motion at the
close of the State's evidence moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the defendant was not charged with having possession of property that was recently stolen and that the
evidence failed to disclose any breaking and entering.
As defense counsel stated in his motion "There might have
been other crimes, but he is not charged with having possession of property that is recently stolen.

I mean he is

charged with the breakin:;; and entering." (T.56-57).
In addition

to revealing defendant's impec-

uniosity to the jury in his opening statement (T.S) counsel
allowed witnesses to disclose to the jury that an agent from
Adult Probation and Parole was involved in dealings with
the defendant.

See fer example (T.7,8,12 and 27-28).

Not

only was that disclosurE made but also the fact that the
agent from Adult Probation and Parole had known defendant

-3-
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for ten years (T.28) and that defendant had been incarcerated in the Utah State Prison (T.54).

All such disclosurEs

were made without objection by counsel and without cautionary instructions to the jury.
The record further discloses that tte trial
counsEl failed to take even the rudimentary step of excluding the witnesses during the trial.

See e.g.

(T.22,28,40,

46,62 and 70).
Counsel further failed to properly investigate the case as evidenced by the fact that he asked witness
Ziegler how long he had known the defendant Gray and where
he had met him, thereby eliciting otherwise inadmissible
testimony most detrimental to his client.

A reasonable

investigation would have disclosed that defendant Gray was
in prison at that time with the witness.

This lack of

investigation or sheer incompetency is further evidenced
by defense counsel's failure to question witness Ziegler
relative to any promises or inducements made by the prosecutor or any follow-up of Hr. Ziegler's prior felony
conviction, notwithstanding that Ronald Ziegler was a crucial
witness.
The record is replete with hearsay statErnents
and other objectionable evidence to Hhich defense counsel
failed to make any objections or have stricken.
counsel did not request precautionary

Defense

instruction~

appar-
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ently because he did not realize
tionable.

the evidence was object-

The cumulative effect of this failure to object

and/or strike testirrony is further compounded by the fact
that closing arguments were not recorded or included in
the transcript, resulting, at best, in pure conjecture
ES

to the use made of objectionable evidence in closing

arguments.
This Court has reviewed numerous attempts to
overturn convictions on the grounds trat the defendant was
deprived effective assistance of counsel.

For example,

as recently as July 26, 1978 in State v. Pierren, Consolidated cases Ne. 14912, 15108, 15109, and 15114, the Court
reiterated the long standing rule applicable to such cases:
"to show inadequate or ineffEctive
counsel, the record must establish that
counsel was ignorant of the facts or the
law, resulting in withdrawal of a crucial
defense, reducing the trial to a "farce
and a sham"." Citing State v. Mc.Nichol,
554 P.2d 203 (Utah, 197
That standard was further explained in State v.
McNichol, supra, in which the Court stated:
"he is entitled to the <issistence of
a competant member of the Bar, who shows
a willingness to identify himself with
the interests of the accused and presents
such defenses as are available under the
law and consistent with the etf.ics of the
professions." Id. at 204.
Maturally, the defendant must be able to show
that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was a
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demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter.

Fl.rtt.er,

trial strategy must be differentiated from failures to
investigate or effectively represent clients.

As stated

in People v. Martinez, 14 Cal.3d 533, 121 Cal.Rptr. 611,
535 P.2d 739 (1975):
"The cases involving a failure to
make factual and lep,al inquiries and
investigations necessary to a constitutionally adequate defense are to be distinquinshed, of course, from cases
wherein counsel, having made such inquiries and investigations makes tactical
or strategic decisions ... 11 535 P. 2d at
742.
The record in this case clearly shows that
drfense counsel was ignorant of both the facts and the
law.

Time after time hearsay, non-responsive answers, or

evidence without foundation was admitted without objection
and without motions to strike.

Naturally enough not all

hearsay statements or non-responsive answers are claimed
to prejudicial, however, a review of the entire rEcord leads
to the inescapable conclusion that due to defense counsel's
inability to control the admission of hearsay and non-responsive testimony, defendant Gray was deprived a fair
trial.

For example, Officer Downer testified as to Hr.

Stanley's identification of certain items of evidence (T.
11,12, 13 and 14), statements made by Mr. Butters with respect to l~. Gray (T.14) and the hardship that the victim
underwent (T.13).

Defense counsel further compounded the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

error with the first witness when he elicited testimony
from Officer Downer that Mr. Butters stated that both
Butters and Gray had been behind thE wheel of the pickup
truck the night in question (T.19).
Defense counsel followed the same pattern
with the second witness, Officer Lance.

During that

testimony defense counsel elicited several damaging nonresponsive answers concerning defendant's association with
witness Butter's without seeking the Court's assistance
in having the witness respond to the question or having
the

answers stricken.

See (T.26).

Defense counsel also

permitted substantial testimony concerning a search which
was totally irrelevant to the case inasmuch as none of
the items obtained in the search were offered as evidence,
See (T.29).
The list could go on and on with respect
to the subsequent witnesses and counsel's failure to object
to hearsay, non-responsive answers or lack of foundation.
See for example (T.53).
Counsel's further failure tc understand the
law of aiding and abetting is made abundantly clear in his
motion to dismiss (T.56-58) and in his opening statement
(T.5).

Although the jury was instructed on the law of

aiding and abetting, counsel apparently believed that the
lack of entry by his client was valid defense.
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Defense counsel was further remiss by failing
to exclude witnesses, a must n:.dimentary tactical decision,
that evinces more a lack of awareness than an informed trial
decision.
The record exudes defense counsel's inability
to control the trial procedure or to confine jt to the
most rudimentary parameters of the Rules of Evidence thereby
depriving him of any opportunity to reasonable assert defendants lack of knowledge concerning the stolen items, lack
of intent to aid or abet,or that an altern<,tive reasonable
hypothesis existed in explanation of the defendant's actions.
This trial was in fact,

"a farce and a sham" and devoid of

"these careful, factual and legal inquiries and investigations necessary to a constitutionally adequate defense."
People v. Martinez, supra, at 742.

Careful

legal inquiry

would have indicated to defense counsel any possible complicity as an aider and abetter as any factual inquiry would
have disclosed to counsel that Ronald Ziegler had known the
defendant-appellant while they were in prison.

Instead,

the trial record evinces questioning by defense counsel
more analogous and attuned to preliminary hearings tt.an
trials.

As a trial it was a farce and a sham.
II.

ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE TENDING TO SHOW

DEFENDANTS PRIOR CONVICTION, PRISON SENTENCE AND RELATION_
SHIP TO ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL
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ERROR.
During the State's case in chief references
to defendant's prior conviction(s) and prison sentence thereon were alluded to in direct examination or cross-examination
of State witnesses (T.54).

The jury also was informed that

an Adult Probation and Parole agent had known defendant for
ten years,

(T.27-28) and that the agent was involved in

the investigation (T.8, 12).
Pursuant to statute, e.g. 78-24-9 U.C.A.

(1953

as amended), and case law a defendant and witness may be
asked whether or not he has ever been convicted of a felony.
Such is a proper scope of inquiry into a testifying person's
credibility.
206 P.

See for example State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6,

717 and State v. Dickson, 12 U.2d 8, 361 P.2d 412

(1961).
Notwithstanding the general principal as to
testifying witnesses, when information is elicited from
witnesses tending to show that the defendant has a propensity to commit crimes or to degrade the defendant, such is
prejudicial error unless the appellate court can conclude
that a different result would not have been obtained.
In State v. Kazda, 14 U.2d 266, 382 P.2d 407
(1963) the prosecutor elicited testimony concerning a conversation the defendant had with an FBI agent in which the
agent implicated the defendant in other crimes for which
the defendant had not been convicted.

The Court held such
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constituted prejudicial error, holding as follows:
"We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial error.
It inplied
that the defendant was imolicated in
other crimes,none of them.proven, and
could have no other effect than to
degrade the defendant and give the
jury the impression that he had a
propensity for crime." 382 P.2d at 409.
Similarly, allegations of crimes subsequent
to the alleged crime for which the defendant is being
tried, absent admissibility under Rule 55, Utah Rules of
Evidence, constitute prejudicial error.

See State v.

Dickson, 12 U.2d 8, 361 P.2d 417 (1961), in wbich the
Court reiterated the well established standard for review:
"Inasmuch as we cannot say with
any degree of assurance that there
would not have been a different result
in the absence of the error ... it must
be regarded as prejudicial and the case
remanded for a new trial." 361 P.2d at 415.
Not all references to other crimes, other than
admission under Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, are
per se prejudicial.

In State v. Hodges, 30 U.2d 367, 517

P.2d 1322 (1974) this Court held that where the trial judge
sustains objections to such evidence, instructs the jury
to disregard such evidence and minimizes tr.e impact of the
entire matter, a jury could be trusted to follow the trial
court's instructions.
The record of defendant Gray's trial reflects
no objection to evidence of prior misdeeds, convictions or
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parole and does not reflect that the evidence was stricken.
The jury was allowed to consider all the evidence without
cautionary instructions.

It is abundantly plain that such

evidence had no probative value whatsoever.

The only

possible effect was one of degradation and indications of
criminal propensity.

Coupled with the dearth of direct

and clear-cut evidence linking defendant to the crime the
jury could easily have relied on the defendant's criminal
history to adjudge him guilty.

Not only was there a re&son-

able likekihood that the trial would have had a different
result,in fact,

the record reflects a strongly compelling

likelihood of acquittal.
COil CL US ION

Appellant submits that the foregoing errors,
each sufficient to justify reversal, combined to deprive
him of a fair trial and due process of law.

This Court

should reverse and remand for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted.

CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I delivered

Z---copies
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to the Office of the Attorney General, State Capital
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah this 18th day of September,
1978.
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